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CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM, 
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This Court granted Peterson's Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Utah Court 
of Appeals opinion in Peterson v. Kennard, 2007 UT App 26, 156 P.3d 834. The court of 
appeals' opinion in Peterson is attached hereto as Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred 
on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether Peterson's asserted lack of representation by counsel during the 
period he could appeal his conviction constitutes a special circumstance permitting him to 
seek post-conviction relief. See attached Order dated July 3, 2007, in Addendum B. 
Issue II: Whether the court of appeals erred in its assignment of the burdens of 
proof applicable to Peterson's petition for post-conviction relief. Id 
Issue III: Whether the court of appeals erred in its assessment of the signed plea 
affidavit in addressing the merits of the district court's denial of Peterson's petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is in 
Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 18, 2000, Petitioner Justin Peterson appeared pro se in Taylorsville Justice 
Court and pled guilty without the benefit of counsel to possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, both class B misdemeanors.1 R.13; see 
Def. Exhibit 7 in Addendum D. On that same date, the justice court judge sentenced 
Peterson to 360 days in jail, but suspended that term, and imposed a number of other 
penalties and conditions. R.13. A week later, on July 25, 2000, the judge revoked 
Peterson's probation and issued a commitment. R. 13. The justice court again revoked 
1
 The justice court considered Peterson's plea to be a plea of guilty, but the affidavit 
indicates in one place that the plea was a no contest plea, and in another place, that the 
plea was a guilty plea. Additionally, on the last page of the plea affidavit, where Peterson 
signed and dated the form, the affidavit is left blank as to whether Peterson was entering 
a plea of guilty or no contest, the nature of the charge is also left blank, and there is no 
factual basis for the plea. See Defendant's Exhibit 7. For convenience, Peterson refers to 
the plea as a guilty plea in this brief, but the affidavit shows that it is unclear whether the 
plea was a guilty or no contest plea. 
2 
Peterson's probation on February 13, 2002 and Peterson began serving the remainder of 
his 360 day sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 16. 
On August 9, 2002, more than two years after judgment was entered and almost 
six months after Petitioner began serving his misdemeanor sentences, the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association (LDA) appeared voluntarily on behalf of Peterson and filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief seeking the release of Peterson from the Salt Lake 
County jail. R. 1-5. The petition claimed that Peterson was sentenced to a suspended jail 
sentence, which had been activated and which he was currently serving, in violation of 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; the petition named Sheriff Aaron Kennard, Chief 
Paul Cunningham, the Salt Lake County Jail, and Taylorsville Justice Court as 
Respondents. R. 1-5. 
A Salt Lake County deputy district attorney answered on behalf of Sheriff 
Kennard, Chief Cunningham and the jail. R. 40-41. That answer acknowledged that the 
petition had been filed, that Peterson was incarcerated, that the named parties were 
"without knowledge with respect to the allegation set forth in the petition" and "will 
immediately and faithfully comply and implement any order issued by the Court in this 
matter." R. 41. Private counsel appeared on behalf of the justice court and answered the 
petition. R. 44-45, 60-67. 
Curiously, the record contains an additional plea affidavit purporting to be the affidavit 
pertaining to this case. R. 68-70. The second affidavit was signed on May 22, 2002, long 
after Peterson entered the plea in this case and well after his probation had been revoked. 
R. 68-70. Like the July 18, 2000 affidavit, the later affidavit is deficient in that it does 
not contain a factual basis for the plea and is inconsistently marked as to whether the plea 
was a plea of no contest or guilty. R. 68-70 
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The district court refused to dismiss the petition as requested by the justice court. 
R. 62-6, 108-12, 145:22-23. Instead, the district court held a hearing on the petition on 
January 17, 2003. R. 145. That court refused to grant relief, however, because it 
concluded that Peterson had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. R. 
109-122. The district court entered findings, conclusions and an order on February 20, 
2003. R. 113-24; see Addendum E. Peterson timely appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed the decision of the district court. Peterson, 2007 UT App 26, ^ 17. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After Taylorsville City charged Peterson with possession of a controlled substance 
and paraphernalia, Petitioner participated in screening and reviews for drug court. R. 12-
13. Appearing for his arraignment, Peterson was ordered to make contact with JSS, a 
private probation agency, for entry into the drug program. R. 12-17. There is no notation 
in the docket indicating that he was advised of his right to counsel at this time. R. 12-17. 
On May 16, 2000, the docket notes that Peterson was found in contempt of court 
and incarcerated in jail for two days. R. 12. The docket does not indicate that Peterson 
was advised of any of his constitutional rights before he was incarcerated. R. 12. When 
Peterson was unable to continue in the drug program, the justice court set his case for 
trial. R. 13. The docket does not indicate that Peterson was advised of his right to have 
appointed counsel represent him at trial. R. 12-17. Peterson appeared pro se on July 18, 
2000, two days prior to the scheduled trial date, and pled guilty as charged to both counts. 
R. 13. The justice court docket indicates that Peterson was "advised of Rule 11 and 
signed waiver." R. 13. 
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Because the justice court is not a court of record there is no record of the plea 
hearing from which the district or appellate court could determine whether the judge 
conducted a colloquy adequate to inform Peterson of his right to counsel and to ascertain 
that Peterson understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. 
Instead, the district court considered the justice court papers, the testimony of Petitioner, 
and the testimony of the justice court judge. 
Taylorsville Justice Court Judge Michael Kwan testified as to his general practice 
in conducting plea hearings. His general practice includes playing the constitutional 
rights videotape created by former Judge Hutchings before court proceedings begin, but 
he did not show the videotape to Peterson on the day of the plea. R. 145:55, 61. The 
judge's general practice is as follows: 
Before we start court proceedings we run the [former] Judge Hutchings 
Constitutional Rights tape. That plays before I take the bench. Then I call 
the cases individually. They come up. I read them the charges, the date 
that it allegedly occurred, location. I ask them if they'd like to make a plea. 
If they do and they enter a plea of guilty or no contest, I ask if they saw the 
tape just in case they were late and then I ask them if they had a chance to 
review a waiver of constitutional rights . . . . 
If they have, then I ask them if they actually read the form. I say, "Have 
you read the constitutional rights? If they have then I ask them if they read 
and understand the English language. After that I ask if they understand 
that by entering a plea, the plea that they've entered, they'd be giving up or 
waiving each of those constitutional rights. Then I ask them if anybody has 
promised them anything in order to get them to enter the plea. I ask them if 
anybody has threatened them or forced them to enter a plea. If it's an 
enhanceable offense then I explain the enhancement and the consequences 
to them and ask them if that changes their mind about entering the plea to 
the charge that they're performing on. 
. . . I would have asked him if he understand [sic] his right to have an 
attorney, that this was a criminal case, that they could go to jail. I ask them 
if they understood that if they wanted an attorney and couldn't afford one, 
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there was a process that we could go through to see if they qualified to have 
one appointed to them at little or no cost to them. I ask them if they want to 
go through that process and if they do, we go through that process. If they 
decline to have an attorney, I don't go much further than going through the 
colloquy. 
R. 145:55-57. The justice court judge also testified that he "might" ask a defendant his 
level of education if he does not know the person. R. 145:58, 29, 46. 
The justice court judge testified further that he had "a specific memory of the 
exact conversation" he had with Peterson over two years earlier. R. 145:72-3, 62. On 
July 18, 2000, Peterson was sitting in the back of the court at the end of the calendar, 
around 4:00 p.m., two days before his scheduled trial. R. 145:59-60, 67, 72. The justice 
court judge asked Peterson what he was doing there, and Petitioner replied that "he 
wanted to end it," "he wanted to get these cases resolved, didn't want to come back to 
trial in two days[.]" R. 145:60, 72-73. The judge then asked whether Peterson wanted to 
change his pleas and Peterson responded affirmatively. R. 145:60,73-74. The judge told 
Peterson to "take a waiver, sit down and read it[.]" R. 145:60,74. 
The judge did not show the Hutchings videotape to Peterson, but thought he had 
viewed it on other days. R. 145:61-62. The judge did not remember asking Peterson 
about his educational level, but thought he had a GED or was working on a GED. R. 
145:74. He also did not specifically ask Peterson if he had read the plea affidavit, but 
testified that he knew "for a fact [Peterson] read it" because the judge told him to and "sat 
on the bench while he read it." R. 145:59-60. The judge said he was comfortable that 
3
 On July 18, 2000, Peterson also signed a plea affidavit and pleaded guilty in another 
case before Judge Kwan. R. 145:43-44; Def. Exhibit 10. 
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Peterson knew what he was doing because the judge was familiar with him due to 
numerous court appearances for drug court and infractions during the past year. R. 
145:59, 68. But the drug court reviews took "less than a minute" and covered things like 
job status, community service and urinary analysis results. R. 145:69-70. And some of 
the reviews were not done by the judge and instead conducted through peer review. R. 
145:70. 
Before accepting the plea, the judge did not ask Peterson if he understood the rules 
of procedure or evidence, or that these rules would apply to him. R. 145:46, 75. He did 
not tell him the dangers or disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. R. 145:76. 
Peterson testified that he did not read the form and instead "grabbed it and 
signatured and then signed it." R. 145:28. He also signed similar affidavits for minor 
cases in the past. R. 145:31; Def. Exhibits 2, 3. He testified that the judge followed 
some of the general practices to which he had testified, but did not ask him some of the 
specific questions used in ascertaining whether an individual defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waives counsel. R. 145:45-46. The judge did not ask Peterson's educational 
level or delve into his understanding of the importance of counsel. R. 145:29, 46. The 
judge also failed to ascertain whether Peterson understood criminal rules or rules of 
evidence, or that they would apply if the case were to go to trial. R. 145:46, 75. He did 
not show the Hutchings videotape and did not ask questions specific to Peterson's 
understanding of the proceedings. R. 145:46,61. No evidence was presented that 
Peterson was informed of his right to a trial de novo. 
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Although the district court reached the merits of Peterson's claim and refused to 
dismiss because Peterson had not appealed, the court of appeals disagreed and held that 
Peterson is not entitled to post-conviction review because he did not file an appeal. 
Peterson, 2007 UT App 26, UH7-12. Alternatively, the court of appeals held that Peterson 
had the burden of proving that his right to counsel was violated and failed to sustain that 
burden. Id. at 1fl[13-16. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Unusual circumstances allowing for post-conviction review even though Peterson 
did not appeal his conviction exist in this case where Peterson claims that he was 
deprived of his right to counsel during the time period for filing an appeal. This Court's 
case law establishes that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or a total deprivation 
of counsel, is an unusual circumstance that allows post-conviction review to a defendant 
who would otherwise not be able to pursue collateral relief. In this case where Peterson 
claims he was deprived of counsel during the time for filing an appeal, allowing post-
conviction review is required by this Court's case law and assures fundamental fairness. 
Pursuant to this Court's case law, the state has the ultimate burden of establishing 
by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived 
counsel when the defendant presents some evidence that he did not make a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel. The evidence presented by the defendant 
can be slight and a defendant's "self-serving" testimony is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of regularity that attaches to a conviction, and to require the government to 
bear the burden of establishing a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel. Peterson's 
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testimony along with evidence that the affidavit did not contain a constitutionally 
adequate waiver and the justice court judge's testimony indicating that the judge did not 
follow the requirements for establishing that a criminal defendant is acting knowingly 
and voluntarily in proceeding without counsel were sufficient to shift the burden to the 
city to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel. 
The evidence in this case does not establish that Peterson knowingly and 
voluntarily waived counsel. First, contrary to the court of appeals' holding, the plea form 
standing alone did not establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 
The plea form does not show, among other things, (1) that the justice court conducted a 
colloquy so as to incorporate the form; (2) that Peterson requested self-representation; (3) 
that Peterson was informed of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se; (4) 
that the justice court assessed Peterson's comprehension and understanding; or (5) that 
the justice court otherwise ensured that Peterson proceeded knowingly and voluntarily 
without counsel. Additionally, the plea form does not comply with due process or Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure since it does not contain a factual basis for 
the plea, is not completely filled out as to the nature of the crimes to which Peterson was 
pleading, and contains inconsistent notations as to whether the plea was no contest or 
guilty. This failure of the plea form to comply with due process and Rule 11 further 
demonstrates that plea form does not establish that Peterson proceeded knowingly and 
voluntarily in waiving counsel. 
The remaining evidence also does not establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Peterson knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. First, the evidence 
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does not show that Peterson clearly and unequivocally requested self-representation. 
Peterson's desire to get his cases resolved and acquiescence in proceeding without 
counsel are distinct from a clear and unequivocal request to proceed without counsel; 
under this Court's case law, the justice court was required to clearly ascertain whether 
Peterson wanted to proceed pro se. In addition, Peterson was not accurately informed of 
the absolute nature of the right to counsel and also was not informed of his right to self-
representation; the fact that proceeding without counsel is a knowing and voluntary 
choice was therefore not clarified for Peterson. The justice court also did not inform 
Peterson of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, assess whether 
Peterson understood what he was doing and the consequences of proceeding without 
counsel, or otherwise ensure that Peterson was proceeding voluntarily, with his eyes 
open, in waiving counsel. In sum, the justice court did not carry out the weighty 
responsibility of ensuring that Peterson made a constitutionally adequate waiver of 
counsel, as required by this Court's case law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION APPLIES IN 
THIS CASE, ALLOWING POST-CONVICTION REVIEW WHERE 
PETERSON WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL IN THE JUSTICE 
COURT OR DURING THE TIME FOR FILING AN APPEAL AND 
CLAIMS THAT HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED 
The common law unusual circumstances exception applies under Utah's Post-
Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA)4 and allows post-conviction review of a criminal 
judgment in some circumstances even though a criminal defendant did not appeal the 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq. (2002). 
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conviction. The exception operates to ensure fundamental fairness and, accordingly, 
applies in circumstances where a defendant was deprived of counsel during time for 
filing an appeal. In this case where Peterson was not represented by counsel until two 
years after judgment and his claim in post-conviction was that his right to counsel had 
been violated, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the unusual circumstances 
exception did not apply. See R. 1-5, 13; Peterson, 2007 UT App 26, ffi[2-9. 
"The unusual circumstances exception provides a defendant who is otherwise 
ineligible to receive post-conviction relief an opportunity to have a petition for post-
conviction relief reviewed." Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, ^[43, 125 P.3d 917 (citing 
State v. Carter, 2001 UT 96, f l5, 44 P.3d 626; Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 
(Utah 1989)). The common law unusual circumstances exception applies under the 
PCRA and operates to "'assure fundamental fairness and to require reexamination of a 
conviction on habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged error was such that it would 
be unconscionable not to reexamine . . . and thereby assure that substantial justice was 
done.5" Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ffl[30-31, 45 (quoting Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 
613 (Utah 1994)) (omissions in the original). Although ordinarily a justice court 
defendant who asserts the denial of the right to counsel "must undergo a trial de novo to 
meet the exhaustion requirement" to be eligible for post-conviction relief (Peterson, 2007 
UT App 26, T|8 (quoting Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^38)), the unusual circumstances rule 
provides an exception to this rule, allowing a court to grant post-conviction relief if it 
determines that unusual circumstances exist. Lucero, 2005 UT 79, [^30. In order to 
qualify for the unusual circumstances exception, a petitioner must "demonstrate that 'an 
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obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right5 has 
occurred." Id at [^45 (quoting Carter, 2001 UT 96,1J15.) 
This Court concluded in Lucero that the unusual circumstances exception did not 
allow review in that case because Lucero filed his petition for post-conviction review 
within the thirty day period for filing a notice of appeal and he was represented by 
counsel when he filed the petition. Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^[45-46. Because Lucero had a 
lawyer at the time when he still could have appealed the justice court judgment, he did 
not "qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to the procedural bar rules . . . . " Id 
This Court stated: 
In this case, Lucero has not demonstrated that unusual circumstances 
exist that excuse his failure to seek a trial de novo. He filed his petition for 
post-conviction relief within thirty days of the date that the justice court 
entered its sentence. At that time, Lucero was still statutorily eligible to file 
for a trial de novo. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002). The record 
indicates that Lucero was represented by counsel at the time he decided to 
pursue post-conviction relief instead of a trial de novo. Given these facts, 
the circumstances surrounding this case do not rise to the level of an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional 
right. 
IdLatH46. 
By contrast, Peterson did not file his petition for post-conviction review until two 
years after judgment was entered, well after the time for filing a notice of appeal. R. 1-5, 
13. Peterson was not represented by counsel in the justice court or during the thirty day 
period during which he could have appealed his conviction and received a trial de novo. 
R. 13-16. In fact, as Peterson argued below, unusual circumstances existed allowing for 
review of his post-conviction petition because he was not represented by counsel until 
12 
two years after judgment was entered, well after the time his eligibility for a trial de novo 
had expired. See Peterson, 2007 UT App 26,1}12. Moreover, Peterson's post-conviction 
claim is the deprivation of counsel throughout the proceedings injustice court; 
specifically, there was no evidence that he was informed of his right to counsel when 
arraigned on the charges, before he was jailed for contempt or when his case was set for a 
bench trial. Nor was any evidence presented that he was informed of his right to a trial 
de novo. Hence, unlike Lucero, unusual circumstances existed in this case where 
Peterson did not have counsel available at any time during the proceedings injustice 
court or after his conviction during the statutory time for filing an appeal. 
The court of appeals incorrectly concluded that although Peterson was not 
represented by counsel during the time for filing an appeal, this did not "excuse [his] 
failure to seek a trial de novo" within the "thirty-day statutory window." Peterson, 2007 
UT App 26,1fl|2-9. Despite this Court's focus in Lucero on whether the petitioner was 
represented by counsel during the critical time for filing an appeal, the court of appeals 
determined that Peterson, who did not have counsel, was not entitled to post-conviction 
review because "the circumstances of Peterson's case 'do not rise to the level of an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right.'" Id. at 
TJ12 (quoting Lucero, 2005 UT 79, *f[46). This conclusion incorrectly applied Lucero and 
fails to recognize that deprivation of counsel during the time for filing an appeal is an 
unusual circumstance allowing post-conviction review even if an appeal was not filed. 
Additional case law further demonstrates that the unusual circumstances exception 
allows review under these circumstances where Peterson claims a deprivation of counsel 
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in the justice court. Unusual circumstances justifying post-conviction review even 
though an issue could have been raised on direct appeal include allegations that the 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal. See Rudolph v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 7,1J7, 46 P.3d 467; Gardner, 888 P.2d at 615; Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 
341, 343-44 (Utah 1980); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2) (2002). Moreover, a 
claim that an attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a timely 
notice of appeal is an unusual circumstance that goes to the fairness of a proceeding and 
allows collateral review. Chess, 617 P.2d at 343-44. 
Unusual circumstances justifying post-conviction review likewise exist when a 
defendant claims that he was denied his right to counsel. Shayesteh v. City of Salt Lake, 
217 F.3d 1281, 1283 (10th Cir. 2000); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101,1114-16 (Utah 
1983) (Stewart, J., concurring); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 
1968). In other words, a claim that a defendant was improperly denied counsel 
"constitutes cause sufficient to overcome procedural default." Shayesteh, 217 F.3d at 
1283. Fairness and due process require post-conviction review under the unusual 
circumstances test when there is an allegation of ineffective assistance at trial or on direct 
appeal because "[i]f counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive 
petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel, they constitute^ a violation of due 
process that is clearly reviewable . . . by postconviction review." Codianna, 660 P.2d at 
1105. When a defendant claims a total deprivation of counsel, the Sixth Amendment is 
violated just as it is when a defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel; this 
deprivation requires that the unusual circumstances test allow review when a defendant 
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such as Peterson claims that he was deprived of counsel during trial court proceedings 
and during the statutory time for filing an appeal. 
In fact, various courts have concluded that unusual circumstances requiring post-
conviction review exist when a defendant claims that he was denied the right to counsel. 
See Shayesteh, 217 F.3d at 1283; Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1114-16 (Stewart, J. concurring); 
Brown, 440 P.2d at 968; Hawk v. Turner, 326 U.S. 271 (1945). A claim that a defendant 
was improperly denied counsel "overcome[s] procedural default" (Shayesteh, 217 F.3d at 
1283) because a deprivation of counsel in state court proceedings amounts to a violation 
of due process that allows for collateral review of a conviction. See Hawk, 326 U.S. at 
275, 278. Just as an obvious injustice that affects the basic fairness of a proceeding 
occurs when a defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel (see Chess, 617 P.2d 
at 342-44), an obvious injustice affecting the fairness of the proceeding and the reliability 
of the outcome occurs when a defendant suffers a total deprivation of counsel. It would 
be inherently unfair and "unconscionable not to reexamine" a conviction where the 
defendant was deprived of counsel, just as it would be unconscionable not to reexamine a 
conviction where there are allegations of ineffective assistance. See Gardner, 888 P.2d at 
613 (quoting Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035). 
This Court has reviewed claims made in post-conviction petitions on the merits 
when there is a claim that the defendant was deprived of counsel at trial or on appeal. See 
e.g. Brown, 440 P.2d at 970; Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978). As 
Justice Stewart explained in Codianna, this review on the merits demonstrated that this 
Court recognized that a claim that the defendant was deprived of counsel is an unusual 
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circumstance justifying post-conviction review. Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1114 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
In Brown this Court in fact addressed the merits of the habeas petitioner's 
claims; it did not dismiss them solely on the ground that the alleged errors 
were known or should have been known at the time of the conviction. The 
petitioner's claims in that case were that he had been denied his right to 
counsel and that he was not properly advised of the consequences of his 
plea of guilty. A reading of the opinion makes clear that the petitioner 
either knew or should have known at the time of his conviction of those 
errors that were later asserted in his habeas petition. Although the court 
ruled that there was no merit to those claims, the critical point here is that 
the Court deemed it entirely appropriate to address the merits even though 
petitioner had failed to take a direct appeal. 
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). While Webster and Brown do not directly discuss the 
deprivation of counsel as an unusual circumstance justifying collateral review, the review 
on the merits in those cases rather than a dismissal of the post-conviction petitions 
demonstrates that a claim that the right to counsel has been violated allows collateral 
review even if an issue could have been raised on appeal. Indeed, this Court's analysis in 
Lucero regarding whether unusual circumstances were present allowing for post-
conviction review focused on the fact that Lucero was not denied the assistance of 
counsel during the period he was statutorily able to seek a trial de novo "but decided to 
pursue post-conviction relief instead.. . ." Lucero, 2005 UT 79, T|46. 
Case law clarifies that the deprivation of counsel is an unusual circumstance that 
allows for habeas corpus review. See e.g. Brown, 440 P.2d at 970. In addition, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2) explicitly allows post-conviction review when a ground 
could have been raised on appeal "if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel." Id This section encompasses claims of complete deprivation of 
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counsel since a defendant who is deprived of counsel does not receive effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Lucero and additional case law support that Peterson's circumstances and claim 
that he was deprived of the right to counsel fall under the unusual circumstances 
exception allowing review on the merits of his post-conviction petition. Peterson was not 
represented by counsel throughout his justice court proceedings, including the statutory 
period for seeking a trial de novo. The justice court docket supports that Peterson was not 
only not represented when he entered his guilty plea but also that he was not represented 
by counsel when held in contempt of court and jailed for two days. Furthermore, it does 
not appear that Peterson was ever informed of his right to a trial de novo. Because 
Peterson claimed that he was deprived of counsel, his claim necessarily includes a claim 
that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel, allowing post-conviction review 
under the unusual circumstances exception. The court of appeals' decision that unusual 
circumstances did not allow for collateral review should be overruled. 
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION PLACING THE 
ENTIRE BURDEN ON PETERSON TO ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S 
RECENT DECISION IN STATE V. FERGUSON AND OTHER 
CONTROLLING CASE LAW. 
In conflict with case law from this Court, the court of appeals improperly placed 
the entire burden of establishing a Sixth Amendment violation on a criminal defendant 
when the record shows that the defendant acquiesced in proceeding without counsel by 
signing a plea affidavit. Additionally, the court of appeals improperly disregarded 
Peterson's evidence that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, saying 
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that the only evidence Peterson offered was "his own self-serving testimony[.]" Peterson, 
2007 UT App 26, ^16. Because a defendant's testimony that he was deprived of his right 
to counsel is sufficient to shift the burden to the government to establish a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the court of appeals' analysis conflicts with case 
law from this Court. 
Offering an alternative ground for affirmance, the court of appeals concluded that 
the "district court's dismissal of Peterson's PCRA petition on its merits was proper . . . ." 
Peterson, 2007 UT App 26 at 1J13. The court determined that "where there is some 
evidence that a defendant has acquiesced in the trial court's failure to appoint counsel, the 
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that he did not validly waiver his right 
to counsel." Id at (^14 (citing Lucero, 2005 UT 79, T[25). Because Peterson signed plea 
waiver forms that included a statement regarding the right to counsel, the court decided 
that the record showed that Peterson had "acquiesce[d] in the justice court's failure to 
appoint counsel" and the burden of establishing a Sixth Amendment violation therefore 
shifted to Peterson. Id at ^[15-16. The court concluded that because Peterson "offered 
no evidence of a Sixth Amendment violation . . . besides his own self-serving testimony," 
he "failed to meet his burden of proving a violation." Id. at ^ 16. 
The court of appeals' analysis is in conflict with this Court's recent decision in 
State v. Ferguson, 2007 UT 1, P.3d (petition for cert, filed). In Ferguson, this 
Court addressed the issue of which party bears the burden of proof in a collateral attack 
on a previous conviction when the defendant claims he was denied counsel. Id. 
Recognizing the "constitutional importance of counsel," this Court reiterated the 
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"'special status' in our jurisprudence [of right to counsel claims]." Id. at ^37-38. As 
Ferguson explains, a presumption of regularity attaches to a previous conviction, even 
when the prior conviction was obtained without counsel. Id at ffi[10, 33-39. The 
defendant then has the burden "to rebut this presumption by offering some evidence that 
he 'did not knowingly waive counsel.5" IdL at [^39. The burden to produce some 
evidence is slight, however, and the presumption of regularity can be overcome by 
minimal evidence, including the defendant's own testimony that he was denied counsel. 
Id. at *|fl[39-40. Once the defendant presents some evidence that he was denied the right 
to counsel, the state has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. Id. at ^[41. 
Although the state argued in Ferguson that a defendant's "self-serving" statement 
was not enough to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to a prior 
conviction, this Court rejected that claim. Id at ^40. This Court was "troubled . . . that 
requiring defendants to produce more than a minimal amount of rebuttal evidence could 
undermine their constitutional rights." Id Accordingly, this Court overruled the court of 
appeals' decision in State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, 68 P.2d 1035, to the extent 
Gutierrez disallowed the use of a defendant's "self-serving" testimony to overcome the 
presumption of regularity. Ferguson, 2007 UT 1, ^ |40. This Court also made it clear that 
"[although a defendant bears some burden of proof in a collateral challenge to an 
unappealed prior conviction, the State bears the ultimate burden." Id 
In summary, although Ferguson must do more than merely produce a 
copy of the conviction reflecting that he was not represented by counsel, he 
need only come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption of 
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regularity. His own testimony that he did not waive his right to counsel is 
sufficient for this purpose. If Ferguson produces such evidence, the burden 
then shifts to the State to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Ferguson knowingly waived his right to counsel. 
hiatal. 
The court of appeals' holding placing the burden on Peterson to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation conflicts with this Court's decision in Fergusons which places the 
ultimate burden of establishing a knowing and voluntary waiver on the state once a 
defendant produces some evidence that his right to counsel was violated. Peterson 
presented "some evidence" to rebut the presumption of regularity in this case. In addition 
to presenting the inadequate and incomplete plea affidavits used to secure Peterson's 
waiver of counsel and a copy of the docket showing that he was not represented by 
counsel and did not make a constitutionally adequate waiver, Peterson presented his 
testimony to demonstrate the justice court's failure to meet the requirement of a 
constitutionally valid waiver as set forth by Utah case law. See State v. Pedockie, 2006 
UT 28, f38, 137 P.3d 76; State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998) (abrogated by 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28); State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 n.12 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Petty, 2001 UT App 396, |6 , 38 P.3d 998. 
The information presented injustice court also shows that Peterson did not ask to 
proceed pro se, was not informed of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without 
counsel, and did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty as charged to the 
two misdemeanor counts in this case. These circumstances further demonstrate that the 
minimal evidence needed to rebut the presumption of regularity under Ferguson was 
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presented in this case, and the court of appeals therefore incorrectly placed the burden of 
establishing that he did not waive counsel on Peterson. 
Additionally, the court of appeals' dismissal of Peterson's "own self-serving 
testimony" (Peterson, 2007 UT App 26, ^fl6) disregards Ferguson, including this Court's 
concern in that case that requiring more from a defendant "would undermine the 'special 
status' that [the Court] afforded to deprivation of counsel claims in Lucero. Id. at [^40. 
Like this Court, courts in other jurisdictions that allocate the burden of proof similarly to 
Utah have recognized that a defendant's minimal burden can be satisfied through his own 
testimony. For example, in State v. Baker, 485 N.W.2d 237 (Wis. 1992), the defendant 
collaterally challenged, inter alia, his prior conviction for operating a motor vehicle after 
revocation. Id. at 248. The court outlined a similar allocation of burdens to that in Utah: 
Because the defendant must overcome the presumption of regularity 
attached to the prior conviction, the defendant bears the initial 
burden of coming forward with evidence to make a prima facie 
showing of a constitutional deprivation in the prior proceeding. If 
the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of the right 
to counsel, the state must overcome the presumption against waiver 
of counsel and prove that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived the right to counsel in the prior proceeding. 
Id. To meet his burden of proof, defendant proffered two sworn affidavits, one his 
own testimony that he did not waive his right to counsel. Id, The court concluded 
that these affidavits were enough to shift the burden back to the state. Id; see also 
State v. Fussy, 467 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Minn. 1991) (holding defendant's pretrial 
motion and accompanying affidavit were enough to shift burden to the state). 
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The court of appeals' rejection of Peterson's "own self-serving testimony" 
(Peterson, 2007 UT App 26, {^16) is contrary to this Court's decision in Ferguson. 
Peterson's testimony alone or with the other evidence demonstrating that the trial court 
did not ensure that he proceeded knowingly and voluntarily without counsel was 
sufficient to meet Peterson's minimal burden of demonstrating that his right to counsel 
was violated. As outlined in Ferguson, the burden shifted to the state to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Peterson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to counsel. Therefore, the court of appeals' decision placing the burden on Peterson and 
disregarding his testimony should be reversed. 
POINT III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT PETERSON 
MADE A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID WAIVER BECAUSE HE 
SIGNED A PLEA AFFIDAVIT CONFLICTS WITH UTAH'S WAIVER OF 
COUNSEL CASE LAW. 
A waiver of counsel is not constitutionally adequate under the Sixth Amendment 
unless the trial court has "ensure[d] that the waiver is voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent." Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^ J26. For a waiver of counsel to be knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently made, the record must demonstrate that (1) the defendant 
requested to proceed without counsel; (2) the defendant was fully informed of and 
understood the nature of his right to counsel; (3) the trial court made sure that the 
defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel; and 
(4) the trial court assessed the defendant's knowledge and understanding in order to 
ensure that the defendant proceeded knowingly and voluntarily without counsel. See id. 
at ^28-29. Given these requirements, the affidavit failed to demonstrate a 
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constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel. In addition, a review of the record as a 
whole demonstrates that Peterson did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
counsel. 
A. The Sixth Amendment Requires that the Record Show that the Trial Court 
Ensured that a Defendant Proceeded Knowingly and Voluntarily for There to Be a 
Constitutionally Adequate Waiver of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the r ight . . . to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI. This amendment, applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an accused the right to counsel and 
requires appointment of counsel if the defendant is indigent. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 
(citing inter alia Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963)). "Under both the 
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, criminal defendants have the right 
to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of [their] criminal proceeding[s]." State 
v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194, f 1 1, 163 P.3d 707 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted) (alterations in original). 
The right to counsel plays a fundamental role in a criminal proceeding and trial 
courts are therefore required to "jealously protect[ ]" that right. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 
at 917. In fact, "c[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did 
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.'" Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f25 (quoting 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). Because of the fundamental nature of 
the right to counsel, a trial judge has the "weighty responsibility . . . of determining 
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whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." Heaton, 958 P.2d 
at 917 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)). 
This Court recently took the "opportunity to clarify [its] prior case law regarding 
appellate review in cases involving waiver of the right to counsel." Pedockie, 2006 UT 
28, [^42. There are "three methods pursuant to which a defendant may give up his right to 
the assistance of counsel: waiver, forfeiture by conduct and waiver by conduct." Id. at 
%L1. Forfeiture, which occurs as the result of a defendant's "'extremely dilatory conduct' 
or abusive behavior" and waiver by conduct, which occurs when a defendant who "has 
been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics" are not at 
issue in this case. See id. at Tffi32, 33. Instead, the question in this case is whether 
Peterson truly waived his right to counsel in the justice court proceedings. 
A defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to counsel will only be valid "if he 
acts knowingly and intelligently, being aware of the dangers inherent in self-
representation." Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^ [29. "True waiver typically occurs only when a 
defendant affirmatively requests permission to proceed pro se" Id. at ^28. This Court 
requires defendants to '"clearly and unequivocally' request self-representation in order to 
waive their right to counsel." Id at «[28 (citing State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, [^16, 979 
P.2d 799). "True waiver" of counsel did not occur in Pedockie "because Pedockie never 
expressed a desire to represent himself. To the contrary, the record is replete with 
instances of Pedockie insisting that he 'want[ed] adequate counsel' and that he was 'not 
going to represent himself.'" Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, p o (alteration in original). 
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Even when a defendant asks to proceed without counsel, he does not make a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to counsel unless "he acts knowingly and 
intelligently, being aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation." Pedockie, 2006 
UT 28,1J28. A colloquy on the record between a defendant and the trial court is the most 
reliable and "preferred method for determining whether a defendant is aware" of the risks 
of self-representation and otherwise makes a constitutionally adequate waiver of 
counsel." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f70, 63 P.3d 731; 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, YP9, 39, 42. "The reasoning behind this requirement is that the 
information necessary for the court to make its determination generally can only be 
elicited after penetrating questioning by the trial court." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (citing 
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948), for the proposition that "[a] judge can 
make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely 
made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances"). 
In the absence of a colloquy, a reviewing court can nevertheless "review the 
record de novo to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 
his right to counsel." Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^45. The validity of a waiver turns "upon 
whether the defendant understood the consequences of waiver." Id. Although the 
reviewing court can conduct a de novo review of the "'particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding each case,'" this Court nevertheless has emphasized that in the absence of a 
colloquy, a valid waiver of counsel will rarely be found. Id This is so because of "the 
fundamental nature of the right to counsel" and the requirement that "any doubts must be 
resolved in favor of the defendant." Id. 
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For a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, 
[T]he trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation. The court should explain the 
consequences of a decision to proceed pro se and, at a minimum, must 
"ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to 
understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent 
himself 
Id. at <p8; Heaton, 958 P.2d 918 (outlining the requirements for a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of counsel); People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110, 118 (1982) (emphasizing 
that waiver of the right to counsel is not "a routine, rubber-stampable formality . . ." and 
that '"a right too easily waived is no right at all'5'). The requirements for a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel are succinctly outlined in Pedockie: 
[B]efore we will accept a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel, we 
have required that he be "aware of the dangers and disadvantages [ ] of self-
representation," and we continue to strongly recommend a colloquy on the 
record as the preferred method of determining whether a defendant is aware 
of these risks. Indeed, a trial court generally cannot determine a 
defendant's understanding without engaging in the 'penetrating 
questioning' found in a colloquy. The sixteen point colloquy found in State 
v. Frampton establishes a sound framework for efficient and complete 
questioning. Moreover, on appeal, such a colloquy provides the reviewing 
court with "'an objective basis for review' upon the almost inevitable 
challenge to the waiver by the defendant who proceeds pro se and is 
subsequently convicted. 
Absent a colloquy on the record, a reviewing court should review the 
record de novo to determine whether the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. De novo review is appropriate 
because the validity of a waiver does not turn upon "whether the trial judge 
actually conducted the colloquy," but upon whether the defendant 
understood the consequences of waiver. A de novo review allows a 
reviewing court to analyze the "particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding each case" to make that determination. But we pause to note 
that, considering the strong presumption against waiver and the 
fundamental nature of the right to counsel, any doubt must be resolved in 
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favor of the defendant. We therefore anticipate that reviewing courts will 
rarely find a valid waiver of the right to counsel absent a colloquy. 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ffl[42, 45 (further citations omitted). 
B. The Plea Affidavit Does Not Establish a Knowing and Voluntary Waiver of the 
Right to Counsel 
Rather than analyzing the facts in this case in light of Pedockie and other waiver 
of counsel case law from this Court, the court of appeals concluded that because Peterson 
signed a plea affidavit which included a reference to counsel, he not only acquiesced in 
proceeding without counsel but he also made a constitutionally adequate waiver of 
counsel because he failed to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Peterson, 2007 UT 
App26,ffl[15-16. 
[The plea form] alone is sufficient to evidence Peterson's affirmative 
acquiescence in the justice court's failure to appoint counsel and shift the 
burden of establishing a Sixth Amendment violation onto Peterson. 
Peterson offered no evidence of a Sixth Amendment violation before the 
district court besides his own self-serving testimony, and we have no 
difficulty affirming the district court's conclusion that Peterson failed to 
meet his burden of proving a violation. 
Id.at1fl6. 
This decision fails to acknowledge Pedockie or this Court's clarification in that 
case that a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel does not occur unless (1) a 
defendant requests to proceed pro se; (2) the record as a whole demonstrates that the 
defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel; and 
(3) the record shows that the defendant understood the consequences and knowingly and 
voluntarily chose to proceed pro se. Moreover, the upshot of the court of appeals' 
decision in this case is that a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel could be found any 
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time a defendant signs a plea affidavit. This is contrary to Ferguson, which outlines the 
application of the burden of proof when the state seeks to later use a prior conviction 
obtained in the absence of counsel, as well this Court's waiver of counsel case law which 
requires more than a signed waiver of counsel form in order to establish that a defendant 
proceeded knowingly and voluntarily. 
The affidavit form used by the justice court for the plea at issue in this case is 
labeled "Waiver of Constitutional Rights" and contains a section purporting to list the 
constitutional rights a defendant forgoes when pleading guilty5. See Def. Exhibit 7 in 
Addendum D. With regard to the right to counsel, the affidavit states: 
I have been informed and understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. Specifically, I 
waive my right to: 
1. COUNSEL. I have the right to consult with and be represented by 
an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am too poor to be 
able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent 
me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to 
pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
See Addendum D. 
5
 The last two "constitutional rights" listed in the affidavit as rights a defendant waives 
by pleading guilty are not constitutional rights being waived and instead are information 
about the timing for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and the use of prior convictions 
for enhancement. Although the lead-in indicates that a defendant waives these "rights" 
by pleading guilty, that statement is incorrect in the context of the information contained 
in numbers 7 (Withdrawal of Plea) and 8. (Enhanced Penalties for Future Convictions). 
The affidavit therefore is confusing as to the significance of the eight items listed under 
the section labeled "Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights." 
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As a preliminary matter, in order to consider the contents of the plea affidavit, that 
affidavit must be incorporated into the plea colloquy as required by Utah case law. See 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,1fl5, 22 P.3d 1242; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217-18 
(Utah 1991); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987). The trial court must 
personally establish during the colloquy "that the defendant has read, has understood, and 
acknowledged [all of the information contained in] the affidavit." Visser, 2000 UT 88, 
T^fl 1-12. An affidavit can be considered when the trial court questions the defendant 
during the plea hearing and ascertains that the defendant read and understood the 
affidavit, and clarifies any ambiguities, omissions or uncertainties. State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470, 476-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Because nothing in this affidavit indicates that 
the justice court conducted the colloquy necessary to incorporate the affidavit, the 
contents of the affidavit cannot be considered and the affidavit standing alone fails to 
demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 
Even if the affidavit is considered, however, the affidavit on its face is insufficient 
to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. At a minimum, the 
affidavit fails to clearly and correctly advise a defendant of the nature of the right to 
counsel and the right to self-representation, fails to inform a defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and fails to ascertain that a defendant has 
the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of 
proceeding pro se. See Def. Exhibit 7. Moreover, the affidavit fails to fully inform 
defendants of all the rights they are giving up, in particular, the right to a trial de novo 
should they appeal, and the risks they are taking when waiving their right to counsel; 
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such information is required by Utah case law to ensure that a defendant's waiver of 
counsel is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, 
TI29;Heaton,958P.2dat918. 
Initially, nothing in the language of the plea form demonstrates that Peterson 
requested that he be permitted to proceed without counsel. While he acquiesced in 
proceeding without counsel by signing the form, such acquiescence is different from the 
request to proceed pro se which is required for true waiver. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, 
ffi[28-30; compare Ferguson, 2007 UT 1 (outlining burdens of proof for determining 
whether uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid for enhancement of subsequent 
charge in circumstances where defendant acquiesced to proceeding without counsel). 
And telling a judge that "he wanted to end it," "he just wanted to get his cases resolved" 
is not a "clear and unequivocal" request to proceed without counsel (see R. 12-17; 
145:60, 72-73); in fact, those statements do not address the issue of counsel and instead 
simply inform the court that the defendant would like to resolve his cases. Requiring a 
defendant to "'clearly and unequivocally' request self-representation helps ensure that 
any waiver of counsel is truly knowing and voluntary. Because a defendant must 
"'clearly and unequivocally' request self-representation in order to waive their right to 
counsel" (Pedockie, 2006 UT 28,f28 (quoting Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^16)), the affidavit, 
which does not contain such a clear and unequivocal request, fails to establish a 
constitutionally adequate waiver. 
Even if agreeing to plead guilty without counsel present is considered a request to 
proceed without counsel, however, the circumstances must nevertheless demonstrate that 
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the defendant acted knowingly and voluntarily in waiving counsel. Pedockie, 2006 UT 
28, f28. The language of the plea form, which fails to specify the absolute nature of the 
right to counsel, further demonstrates that Peterson did not knowingly waive his right to 
counsel. Rather than clearly stating that Peterson had the absolute right to be represented 
by court appointed counsel if he were indigent, the form equivocates, leaving the 
impression that the trial court has discretion as to whether to appoint counsel; the form 
also suggests that even if counsel is appointed, Peterson could be required to pay for that 
lawyer's service just as he would have to do if he were to retain counsel. The affidavit 
never conveys the constitutional magnitude or absoluteness of the right to counsel and 
instead suggests that the right is qualified, and the decision as to whether to appoint lies 
within the discretion of the judge, including the discretion to require the defendant to pay 
for the lawyer's services just as he would if he were to retain a lawyer. The form also 
says nothing about the right to self-representation, thereby failing to clarify that a person 
who proceeds without counsel is making a choice to do so. Because the form did not 
clearly inform Peterson that he had the right to court-appointed counsel if he were 
indigent, any purported waiver of that right by signing the form is not knowingly made. 
See Def Exhibit 7 in Addendum D. 
Additionally, nothing in the plea form demonstrates that the trial court made any 
effort to converse with Peterson, to assess his understanding, to make sure that he 
understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, or to otherwise ensure 
that Peterson was proceeding without counsel because he had knowingly and voluntarily 
chosen to proceed pro se. Informing a defendant in Peterson's position of the dangers 
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and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel was necessary for there to be a knowing 
waiver of counsel, and the absence of any such information in the plea affidavit precludes 
a conclusion that the waiver was knowing and voluntary based solely on the affidavit. 
Peterson had other charges and faced jail time for this case. He had enrolled in 
drug court, thereby essentially acknowledging to the justice court judge that would 
eventually preside at any trial that the possession charge had some merit. As a lay person 
with minimal education, it would be unlikely that Peterson would understand he could 
challenge the city's evidence and the city would need admissible evidence to prove the 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of what had transpired to date in the case. 
Also, since the affidavit did not inform Peterson that he would receive a trial de novo and 
new judge if he were to appeal, Peterson had no way of knowing that an appeal would 
bring him a judge who had not been involved with him in drug court. 
Moreover, the record does not indicate that Peterson had been represented by 
counsel in the past; hence, unlike the situation where this Court "reasoned that the 
defendant should have realized the c value of counsel' because he was represented by 
counsel in a prior trial" (Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, [^29 (citing Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-
89), Peterson had not had the opportunity to be represented by counsel and therefore was 
not in a position to realize the "value of counsel" in these cases. Under these 
circumstances, when also faced with information that he might have to pay for a lawyer 
even though he was indigent, information regarding the danger and disadvantages of 
proceeding without counsel was critical to a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to 
counsel. 
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Additional deficiencies in the affidavit further demonstrate that the affidavit did 
not establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Neither the 
affidavit used in this case, nor any of the other affidavits admitted below, include a 
factual basis for the plea; these affidavits therefore violate Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and due process. £ee Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). "[T]o make a 
knowing guilty plea, the defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged 
and the relationship of the law to the facts." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the plea affidavits failed to include any of the facts surrounding Peterson's 
alleged violation of the statute. See id at 1313 (stating an "affidavit should contain both 
a statement of the elements of the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's acts that 
establish the elements of the crimes charged"). There is therefore nothing in the plea 
affidavit or the record to show that Peterson understood how his actions established the 
elements of the crime charged. Because the affidavit did not contain a factual basis for 
the plea, Peterson's plea form failed to show that Peterson understood the relationship of 
the law to the facts. The plea, therefore, was taken in violation of Rule 11 and due 
process. When a defendant waives his right to counsel along with other rights while 
pleading guilty and the guilty plea is not in compliance with Rule 11 and due process, 
any purported waiver of counsel is not knowing and voluntary. See generally Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 917 (requiring judge to ascertain that defendant understands nature of the 
charges and proceedings for there to be a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel).6 
6
 Def. Exhibit 10, the other plea affidavit Peterson signed on July 18, 2000 contains 
deficiencies similar to those in Def. Exhibit 7. That affidavit does not contain a factual 
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The affidavit also contains confusing notations as to whether Peterson was 
pleading guilty or no contest to the charge. At the top of the affidavit, the box indicating 
that the defendant intends to plead guilty is checked; immediately thereafter, the word 
"yes" is entered in the box indicating that the defendant intends to plead no contest. The 
area designated "Entry of Guilty Plea" indicates that by signing the document, the 
defendant intends to enter either a plea of guilty or no contest. Both of those boxes are 
left blank, as is the nature of the violation to which the defendant intends to plead and the 
factual basis for the plea. Although Peterson signed and dated the form, the nature of the 
plea, whether it was a plea of guilty or no contest, as well as the crime and elements are 
not included or made clear. See Addendum D. This further demonstrates that the 
affidavit failed to demonstrate that a plea was taken in compliance with due process and 
Rule 11, thereby further demonstrating that Peterson did not act knowingly and 
voluntarily in proceeding without counsel. See id. 
In light of the Sixth Amendment and this Court's right to counsel case law, the 
affidavit in this case failed to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to 
counsel. Because the affidavit shows only that Peterson acquiesced in proceeding 
without counsel, but does not show that he requested to proceed pro se or was informed 
of and understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, the 
court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the affidavit alone was sufficient to establish a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel. 
basis for the plea and contains inconsistent notations as to whether the plea was a no 
contest or guilty plea. 
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C. The Remaining Evidence Failed to Demonstrate that Peterson Knowingly and 
Voluntarily Waived His Right to Counsel 
The docket, testimony and other evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing 
also failed to demonstrate a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel. That evidence 
did not establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel because (1) 
Peterson was not fully and accurately informed of the nature of his right to counsel or his 
right to choose self-representation; (2) Peterson did not request self-representation; (3) 
Peterson was not informed of and did not understand the dangers and disadvantages of 
proceeding without counsel; and (4) the trial court did not otherwise ensure that Peterson 
chose knowingly and voluntarily to proceed without counsel. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, 
«|38. 
First, the evidence failed to show that Peterson was accurately informed of the 
nature of his right to counsel or his alternative right to choose to proceed without counsel. 
The justice court docket does not contain any notation indicating that Peterson was 
informed that he had the right to counsel at any time prior to July 18, 2000, when he pled 
either no contest or guilty. In fact, the docket is silent as to whether he was advised of 
his right to counsel at arraignment on March 6, 2000, or when he was held in contempt 
and jailed for two days on May 16, 2000. R. 12. Nor does the docket contain a notation 
that Peterson was informed that he had the right to counsel when the justice court judge 
determined that he was unable to enter the drug program and set the case for bench trial. 
R. 13. 
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The first even arguable indication of the right to counsel in the docket appears on 
July 18, 2000, two days before the scheduled bench trial, when Peterson appeared in 
court and told the judge "he wanted to end it," "he wanted to get his cases resolved . . . ." 
R. 12-17; 145:60, 72-73. But nothing in the docket suggests that the justice court spoke 
specifically about the nature of the right to counsel. Instead, the docket entry for July 18, 
2000, states in part: 
Deft appeared early 
Deft entered guilty plea to all charges. 
Deft advised of Rule 11 and signed waiver 
Deft also advised of enhancemen[t] and signed waiver 
See Defendant's Exhibit 7. 
The docket refers to the affidavit as a "waiver" but does not specifically mention 
the right to counsel; the docket also does indicate that the court advised Peterson of Rule 
11, which may or may not have included an accurate discussion of the right to counsel. 
The docket does not contain findings or conclusions by the justice court that Peterson 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. R. 12-17. Nor is there any 
indication in the docket that the justice court judge conducted a colloquy with Peterson 
regarding waiver of counsel or otherwise conducted the type of penetrating questioning 
that is required for a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel. 
The testimony from the justice court judge and Peterson also illustrates that 
Peterson was not clearly advised that he had an absolute right to the appointment of 
counsel as an indigent defendant. The justice court judge testified he had a "specific 
memory of the exact conversation" with Peterson and that when going through a 
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defendant's right to counsel colloquy, he tells "them if you want an attorney, couldn't 
afford one, there's & possibility I'd appoint one for you at little or no cost to you." 
R: 145:77 (emphasis added). When pressed by counsel as to whether he made sure "that 
defendants understand that if they truly are indigent" they have a right to appointed 
counsel, the judge said "Yes." R. 145:77. But the justice court judge subsequently 
reconfirmed that "the words that [he] used [when discussing appointment of counsel] are 
if you're indigent, there's & possibility that [he] can appoint an attorney at little or no cost 
to [the defendant] . . . and then [he] ask[s] them if they would like [him] to appoint them 
a lawyer." R. 145:78 (emphasis added). This testimony indicates that the judge did not 
convey that the right to counsel was absolute and instead conveyed to defendants that he 
had discretion as to whether to appoint counsel. The justice court judge's testimony also 
shows that he does not tell defendants that they have a right to choose self-representation, 
thereby failing to clarify that proceeding without counsel is a choice criminal defendants 
make. This testimony, considered in conjunction with the affidavit that did not clearly 
acknowledge the absoluteness of the right to counsel nor mention the right to self-
representation, demonstrated that Peterson was not adequately informed of the nature of 
the right to counsel or the right to self-representation, and therefore could not knowingly 
waive his right to counsel. 
Although Peterson answered affirmatively that the justice court told him that "if 
[he] couldn't afford a lawyer and if [he] wanted one, the Court would appoint one for 
[him]," (R. 145:42), the justice court's depiction of the right to counsel and its "specific 
memory of the exact conversation" with Mr. Peterson, telling him there was a possibility 
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rather than absolute right, establishes that Peterson was informed that the right to 
appointment of counsel was within the judge's discretion rather than absolute. Contrary 
to the judge's statement to indigent defendants that "there's a possibility" that the court 
can appoint counsel, when a defendant is unable to retain counsel without jeopardizing 
his ability to provide basic necessities for himself and his family, the Sixth Amendment 
requires that counsel be appointed. See State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 282-83 (Utah 
1994). 
Nor did the testimony show that Peterson requested self-representation. While the 
judge testified that Peterson wanted to get things over with, resolving the case does not 
necessarily mean that one proceeds without counsel. In fact, Peterson's request "to end 
it" demonstrated that he did not fully understand the consequences of proceeding without 
counsel since pleading guilty would not "end it" for Peterson, and indicated that an 
accurate and complete discussion of the nature of the right to counsel, the dangers and 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and the potential consequences of resolving 
the cases that day without counsel was necessary. 
Third, the testimony established that Peterson was never informed of the dangers 
and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. In fact, the justice court judge 
admitted that he failed to inform Peterson of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 
without counsel. R. 145:76. For a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily waive his 
right to counsel, the trial court "at a minimum, must 'ascertain that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of 
the decision to represent himself.. . . '" Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, <|38. Therefore, the 
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record must reveal that the judge ascertained that the defendant understood the dangers 
and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. 
In this case, the justice court judge acknowledged that he did not advise Peterson 
of the minimum warning against self-representation, and the plea affidavit also failed to 
advise Peterson of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. This 
failure to advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se 
alone precludes a determination that Peterson made a constitutionally adequate waiver of 
the right to counsel. 
For a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, the trial 
court "at a minimum, must 'ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent 
himself.. . . '" Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, p 8 . In this case, where the plea affidavit and 
testimony demonstrate that Peterson was not advised of, and the judge did not ascertain 
that he understood, the consequences and dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 
without counsel, the record fails to demonstrate that Peterson knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel. 
The remaining circumstances further demonstrate that Peterson did not knowingly 
and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. For example, although the justice court judge 
thought Peterson had reviewed the affidavit, Peterson testified that he never read the plea 
affidavit before he signed it. R. 145:27, 29. Instead, he took the form from a stack on the 
podium, went through the document and initialed the sections, then signed it. R. 145:28. 
Although the justice court judge testified that Peterson had read the affidavit, the judge 
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never asked Peterson if he read it and did not read the form to Peterson. R. 145:28. The 
incompletely filled out affidavits coupled with Peterson's minimal educational level 
further support Peterson's testimony that he did not actually read the affidavit. The judge 
was required to take the step of assessing Peterson's understanding and asking whether 
he read and understood the affidavit in order to ensure that Peterson knowingly and 
voluntarily proceeded without counsel. 
Nor does anything in the docket, plea affidavit, or testimony demonstrate that the 
justice court ascertained that Peterson possessed the intelligence and capacity to 
understand and appreciate the contents of the affidavit or the consequences of proceeding 
without counsel. Indeed, nothing in either the docket or the testimony suggests that the 
justice court judge understood that he was required to assess whether a defendant 
understood the consequences of proceeding without counsel as part of a waiver of 
counsel, and the evidence demonstrates that Peterson did not fully understand the 
consequences of proceeding without a lawyer. 
Peterson appeared at the justice court two days before his scheduled trial. R. 
145:43-44, 59-60. The justice court judge testified that after he had completed his 
calendar, he asked Peterson "what he was doing in court." R. 145:60. Peterson 
responded that he "wanted to get these cases resolved, didn't want to come back to trial 
in two days" "wanted to end it." R. 145:60, 73. This testimony illustrates that Peterson 
did not fully comprehend the consequences of pleading guilty to two class B 
misdemeanors. Instead, Peterson's testimony suggests that he believed that he would not 
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be subjected to jail time but instead would be able to "end" his case and be on his way by 
simply pleading guilty. 
The justice court judge never asked Peterson specific questions regarding his level 
of education or his understanding of the proceedings and consequences. R. 145:29. The 
justice court judge testified that he "might ask" about a defendant's level of education if 
he does not know the person, but "was comfortable that [Peterson] understood English 
and he understood what we were talking about and he understood the consequences of 
what he was doing." R. 145:74. Although the judge apparently thought his previous 
encounters with Peterson were sufficient to establish Peterson's understanding of the 
proceedings in this case, that assumption is not supported by the record. R. 145:67-68. 
The type of information elicited from Peterson during drug court reviews or during his 
appearances on infractions was not the type of information needed to assess whether 
Peterson possessed the intelligence and capacity necessary to understand and appreciate 
the consequences of proceeding without counsel when faced with two misdemeanor 
charges that could result in significant jail time. Moreover, the judge thought Peterson 
had "attended high school and either had a GED or is working towards a GED" (R. 
145:74); this minimal educational level required further inquiry and more penetrating 
questioning to assess whether Peterson understood the contents of the affidavit and the 
consequences of proceeding without counsel. 
7
 The type of information the justice court judge discussed during drug court was 
Peterson's urinalysis results, group meetings, job status and community service. R. 
145:69. These drug court interviews "may last less than a minute" and some of the 
reviews were not conducted by the judge and instead subjected to "peer review." R. 
145:70 
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Also, while the judge ordinarily shows the Hutchings videotape to defendants 
before they enter pleas as an aid to outlining constitutional rights, he did not show the 
videotape to Peterson when he pled guilty. R. 145:61. The justice court judge did not 
ask specific questions necessary to ascertain whether Peterson understood his rights and 
possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand the consequences of proceeding pro 
se. The judge also did not ask Peterson whether he was aware of any type of criminal 
rules, rules of evidence or rules of criminal procedure. R. 145:46. In fact, it was never 
ascertained whether Peterson was aware of the technical rules that would apply to him or 
his understanding of such rules. In sum, the justice court judge failed to engage in the 
type of "thorough inquiry of [Peterson needed] to fulfill its duty of insuring that 
[Peterson's] waiver of counsel [was] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
In this case, Peterson did not request self-representation, the right to counsel and 
the right to self-representation were not adequately conveyed to him, he was never 
informed of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel and the record 
otherwise demonstrates that he did not knowingly and voluntarily proceed without 
counsel, and instead just wanted to get his case resolved. In addition, the justice court did 
not assess whether Peterson understood the contents of the affidavit, his constitutional 
rights, or the consequences of proceeding without counsel. Under these circumstances, 
the justice court did not "jealously protect" the right to counsel and Peterson did not 
make a knowing and voluntary waiver of that fundamental right. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner/Defendant Justin Peterson, by and through counsel, asks this Court to 
overturn the court of appeals' decision and hold (1) unusual circumstances allowed post-
conviction review in this case where Peterson claims that he was deprived of counsel 
during the time for filing and appeal; (2) the state had the ultimate burden of proving a 
knowing and voluntary waiver where Peterson presented "some evidence," including his 
own testimony, that he was deprived of counsel; (3) the plea affidavit standing alone did 
not establish a knowing and voluntary waiver; and (4) the remaining evidence likewise 
did not establish that Peterson knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel Accordingly, 
Peterson requests that the matter be remanded for vacation of the jail sentence. 
SUBMITTED this £ l day of August, 2007. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
HEATHER BRERETON 
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant 
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THORNE, Judge: 
Hi Justin Brent Peterson appeals from the district court's 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002 & Supp. 2006) . We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 On July 18, 2000, Peterson pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor 
charges in justice court. Peterson, who was not represented by 
counsel, was sentenced to 360 days in jail for the two offenses. 
The justice court suspended Peterson's jail sentence and placed 
him on probation. On July 25, the justice court found Peterson 
to be in violation of the terms of his probation and executed his 
suspended sentence. On August 30, after Peterson had served 
thirty-six days in jail, the justice court suspended the balance 
of the sentence and placed Peterson back on probation. Peterson 
violated his probation again, and on February 13, 2002, the 
justice court once more revoked Peterson's probation and 
reinstated his remaining suspended jail time. 
%3 On August 9, 2002, Peterson filed a petition for post-
conviction relief in the district court, alleging that he did not 
knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to be represented by 
counsel at the time of his justice court pleas. The district 
court heard evidence, including the testimony of the justice 
court judge who took Peterson's pleas, and concluded that 
Peterson had failed to meet his burden of establishing a 
violation of his right to counsel. Accordingly, the district 
court dismissed Peterson's petition with prejudice. Peterson 
appeals that dismissal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1J4 Peterson argues that the district court erred in denying his 
petition for post-conviction relief. Peterson alleges that he is 
entitled to relief because he did not make a constitutionally 
valid waiver of his right to counsel prior to pleading guilty, 
pro se, in the justice court, and that the justice court's 
subsequent imposition of suspended jail time on these uncounseled 
convictions violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 
H 5 We review the denial of a petition for post-conviction 
relief "for correctness without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions of law." Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42,117, 94 P.3d 
263 (quotations and citation omitted). The district court's 
findings of fact will be disturbed "only if they are clearly 
erroneous." Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). Upon reviewing the record, "we will not reverse if 
there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's 
refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted." Id. 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
H6 The parties originally briefed this matter prior to the 
issuance of Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, 125 P.3d 917, 
addressing the applicability of the PCRA to convictions arising 
in Utah's justice courts. After Lucero was issued, this court 
requested supplemental briefing from the parties to address the 
applicability of that case to Peterson's. We determine that 
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Lucero controls this case and affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Peterson's petition. 
I. Peterson's Failure to Seek A 
Trial De Novo Bars PCRA Relief 
f7 In Lucero, the Utah Supreme Court addressed and resolved 
multiple issues pertaining to the ability of justice court 
defendants to obtain relief under the PCRA. As a threshold 
matter, Lucero determined that justice court defendants are not 
categorically denied relief under the PCRA. See id. at KH9-19. 
However, Lucero also held that a justice court defendant's 
failure to take advantage of a trial de novo will preclude PCRA 
relief unless the error in the justice court proceedings is the 
sort that cannot be remedied by a new trial. See id. at H1I33-38, 
|^8 As the supreme court explained, 
to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a 
petitioner must pursue any regular and 
prescribed method for attacking a conviction 
or sentence that would provide a plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law. The regular and prescribed 
method for appealing a justice court 
conviction is to seek a trial de novo in the 
district court. Thus, the critical inquiry 
to determine whether a justice court 
defendant must seek a de novo trial in order 
to meet the exhaustion requirement and be 
eligible for post-conviction relief is this: 
could a trial de novo provide the justice 
court defendant with a plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy for the alleged 
constitutional violation? In other words, 
where an appropriate remedy for a 
constitutional violation would be a new 
trial, a justice court defendant must undergo 
a trial de novo to meet the exhaustion 
requirement. To obtain post-conviction 
relief if a justice court defendant has not 
sought a trial de novo, the defendant must 
establish that the constitutional violation 
was the kind that would demand relief beyond 
a new trial. 
Id. at |^38 (citation omitted) . 
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119 The Lucero court suggested that the types of violations that 
might warrant PCRA relief despite a defendant's failure to seek a 
trial de novo include the justice court's failure to grant a 
speedy trial, the loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence, 
and "instances where prosecutorial misconduct is so severe that 
lesser sanctions could not result in a fair trial.11 Id. at 1(38 
n.7. Lucero also expressly determined that a violation of the 
right to counsel at a justice court plea hearing can be remedied 
by a trial de novo, and thus cannot form the basis of PCRA relief 
for a defendant who did not timely appeal his or her conviction 
to the district court. See id. at 1)1(39-41. At a trial de novo, 
Peterson would have been notified of all of his rights again and 
a record would have been created upon which his understanding of 
those rights could be evaluated. But Peterson failed to seek a 
trial de novo, and accordingly, he failed to exhaust his remedies 
and is procedurally barred from obtaining PCRA relief. See id. 
at 1]29 (" [T]o be eligible for post-conviction relief, the 
defendant must have 'exhausted all other legal remedies, 
including a direct appeal.'" (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 
(2002))) . 
II. Unusual Circumstances Are Not Present 
KlO Lucero recognized that even where PCRA relief is barred by a 
defendant's failure to seek a trial de novo, an exception exists 
for unusual circumstances. See Lucero v. Kennard, 2 005 UT 
79,111(30-32, 125 P.3d 917; see also Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 
42,1I1|9, 17-18, 94 P.3d 263 (holding that Utah's common law 
post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence survived the 
enactment of the PCRA). Thus, "once a court determines that a 
defendant is procedurally barred from seeking post-conviction 
relief, the court must then ascertain whether the defendant is 
nevertheless entitled to have an appellate court review the 
petition because unusual circumstances exist." Lucero, 2005 UT 
79 at 1|43. 
Ull "To qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to the 
procedural bar rules, a petitioner must demonstrate that 'an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right' has occurred." Id. at 1]45 (quoting Carter 
v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,1|l5, 44 P.3d 626); see also Hurst v. Cook, 
777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989). "The unusual circumstances test 
was intended to assure fundamental fairness and to require 
reexamination of a conviction on habeas corpus when the nature of 
the alleged error was such that it would be unconscionable not to 
reexamine . . . and thereby to assure that substantial justice 
was done." Lucero, 2005 UT 79 at 1(45 (omission in original) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
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i[l2 While Peterson argues that unusual circumstances exist, he 
has not demonstrated such circumstances in this case. Peterson 
argues that his circumstances are unusual because he was not 
represented by counsel until almost two years after the entry of 
his sentence, and because he sought PCRA relief after the thirty-
day statutory window for seeking a trial de novo had expired. 1 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1) (2002). Neither of these facts 
excuse Peterson's failure to seek a trial de novo, and the 
circumstances of Peterson's case "do not rise to the level of an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right." Lucero, 2005 UT 79 at 1(46. Therefore, 
Peterson is not entitled to the relief he seeks. 
III. District Court's Dismissal of 
Peterson's Petition Was Proper 
[^13 As we have determined, Peterson's failure to seek a trial de 
novo on his justice court convictions renders him ineligible for 
PCRA relief in this matter. As an alternative ground for 
affirming, however, we note that the district court's dismissal 
of Peterson's PCRA petition on its merits was proper in this 
case. 
^14 As Peterson correctly points out, the right to counsel is 
entitled to special protection, and collateral attacks premised 
on violations of the right to counsel are not automatically 
subjected to the same presumption of regularity that attaches in 
other collateral attacks. See Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 
79, ili]24-25, 125 P.3d 917; see also Lackawanna County Dist. 
Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404 (2001) (concluding that a 
failure to appoint counsel claim "warrants special treatment 
among alleged constitutional violations"). Nevertheless, where 
there is some evidence that a defendant has acquiesced in the 
Peterson focuses his supplemental brief on these two facts 
in an apparent attempt to distinguish his case from Lucero v. 
Kennard, 2005 UT 79, 125 P.3d 917. In Lucero, the supreme court 
determined that a defendant had not established exceptional 
circumstances because "[h]e filed his petition for 
post-conviction relief [while he] was still statutorily eligible 
to file for a trial de novo" and he "was represented by counsel 
at the time he decided to pursue post-conviction relief instead 
of a trial de novo." Id. at 146. Although we agree that the 
circumstances of Peterson's case are distinguishable from those 
present in Lucero, they do not establish "'an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional 
right'" as required to constitute exceptional circumstances. Id. 
at 1(45 (quoting Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,1)15, 44 P.3d 626). 
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trial court's failure to appoint counsel, the burden of proof 
shifts to the defendant to establish that he did not validly 
waive his right to counsel. See Lucero, 2005 UT 79 at 1(25. 
Kl5 Here, the record contains a waiver of constitutional rights 
signed by Peterson at the time of his July 18, 2000 pleas.2 In 
relevant part, that waiver stated: 
I have been informed and understand that 
I have the following rights under the 
Constitutions of Utah and of the United 
States. It is my intention to waive my 
constitutional rights and enter a plea 
. . . . Specifically, I waive my right to: 
1. COUNSEL. I have the right to 
consult with and be represented by an 
attorney. If the judge were to determine 
that I am too poor to be able to hire a 
lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to 
represent me. 
Peterson not only signed the document as a whole, but also 
individually initialed the document next to each right waived, 
including the right to counsel. 
1|l6 This document alone is sufficient to evidence Peterson's 
affirmative acquiescence in the justice court's failure to 
appoint counsel and shift the burden of establishing a Sixth 
Amendment violation onto Peterson. Peterson offered no evidence 
of a Sixth Amendment violation before the district court besides 
his own self-serving testimony, and we have no difficulty 
affirming the district court's conclusion that Peterson failed to 
meet his burden of proving a violation. 
CONCLUSION 
1(17 In light of Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, 125 P.3d 917, we 
determine that Peterson's PCRA challenge to his justice court 
2Peterson contends that the written waiver cannot be 
considered because it was not incorporated into the record during 
his plea colloquy. See, e.g.. State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 
117,1(119-20, 69 P.3d 838. However, this rule is limited to 
direct appeals and is not applicable in the PCRA context. See 
State v. Lehi , 2003 UT App 212,1)9 n.3, 73 P.3d 985 
(distinguishing between direct appeals and post-conviction 
proceedings for purposes of applying the incorporation rule). 
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convictions is barred by his failure to seek a trial de novo in 
the district court. As an alternative ground upon which to 
affirm the district court's denial of Peterson's PCRA action, we 
note that the record contains ample evidence to support the 
district court's determination that Peterson failed to prove a 
violation of his right to have counsel present at his justice 
court plea hearing. For these reasons, we affirm the district 
court's order denying Peterson's petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
H18 WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUL 0 3 200? 
ooOoo 
Justin Brent Peterson, 
Appellant, 
Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard, 
Cheif Paul Cunningham, 
Salt Lake County Jail, and 
Taylorsville Justice Court, 




This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on March 19, 2007. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues. 
1. Whether Petitioner's asserted lack of representation by 
counsel during the period he could appeal his conviction 
constitutes a special circumstance permitting him to seek 
post-conviction relief. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in its assignment of 
the burdens of proof applicable to Petitioner's petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
3. Whether the court of appeals erred in its assessment of 
the signed plea affidavit in addressing the merits of the 
district court's denial of Petitioner's petition for post-
conviction relief. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
For The Court: 
Dated 3,2.001 
Christine M. Durham, 
Chief Justice 
TabC 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
TabD 
EXHIBlfr^J 
IN THE MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT 
FOR THE CITY OF TAYLORSVILLE, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF TAYLORSVILLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No. L^  2.0?? 
JUDGE MICHAEL W. KWAN 
Defendant desires this Court allow entry of a plea of : guilty > 
YKS •/ Po~bf 
No Contest to the charge(s) of 
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Defendant states: 
I have been informed and understand that I have the following rights under the constitutions of Utah and of 
the United States. It is my intention to waive my constitutional rights and enter a plea of guilty y ^ s No 
Contest. Specifically, I waive my right to: 
1. COUNSEL. I have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were to 
determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to 
represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. Defendant's Initial ,Vc 
2. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. Although I can choose to testily if I wish, I 
cannot be forced by anyone to take the witness stand and testify or give evidence against myself. 
That I choose not to testify cannot be held against me in court. Defendant's Initial r H p 
3. CONFRONTATION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCUSERS. I have the right to see 
and hear in open court the witnesses who give evidence against me. I have, if I represent myself, or 
an attorney has, in my behalf, the right to ask questions of those witnesses. I also have the right to 
have witnesses who will testify in my behalf subpoenaed or, in other words, called to court at 
government expense. Defendant's Initial ~5~^ f 
4. JURY TRIAL. I can choose to have a jury hear the case against me. Any verdict rendered by a 
jury, whether it be guilty or not guilty, must be by complete agreement of all jurors. Defendant's 
Initial \Q 
5. PRESUMPTION AND PROOF. At trial, I am presumed innocent until proven guilty. The 
burden of proving me guilty of the crime charged is upon the prosecutor who must prove each and 
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's InitiaL\<p> 
6. APPEAL. If I were to be tried and convicted of the crime with which I am charged, I could appeal 
from any errors of the law that may have resulted in my conviction. By law an appeal must be taken 
within 30 days of entry of judgement. Defendant's Initial Y ^ 
7. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA. If I should change my mind about entering this plea by affidavit, I 
must notify the court and the prosecutor, in writing, within 30 days of the entry of my plea or from 
the date of this document whichever is longer My plea may not be withdrawn, once entered, without 
good legal reason to do so. Defendant's Initial .Q^P 
8. ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR FUTURE CONVICTIONS. I have been informed that the plea 
I am entering will result in a conviction. I have been further informed that my plea could be used in 
the future to increase the severity of future criminal offenses and/or increase the severity of the 
sentence I might receive for convictions for criminal offenses Defendant's Initial *3"P 
I understand the English language. I understand each of these constitutional rights. They have been 
explained to me by my probation officer or lawyer. I have no questions about them. I know that I could plead not 
guilty and exercise all of the rights listed above. I understand that by entering a plea of guilty, I am giving up these 
constitutional rights. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA 
I am admitting that I did commit the crime to which I plead guilty. I convict myself of the same as if I were 
found guilty be judge or jury. Where more than one crime is involved, sentences may be imposed one after another, 
consecutively, or may run at the same time, concurrently. In sentencing me, the judge is not required to follow what 
any person recommends. The judge must impose sentence within the following limits: 
Class of Offense 
Class B misdemeanor 
Class C misdemeanor 
Infractions 
Jail Time 
0- 180 days 






I understand that a maximum 85% surcharge is required by state law and will be added to the fines imposed 
by the judge. Further, I understand that the judge may impose other conditions of sentencing including, but not 
limited to supervised or unsupervised probation, community service, counseling/education sessions, or restitution. I 
understand these consequences and have no questions about them. 
ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA 
Of my own choice, I enter this plea. No force, promises, or threats have been made to get me to do it. I am 
not under the influence of alcohol or drugs or anything that would impair my judgement. I have read this document 
or had it read to me. I understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. By signing this document, I 
am saying that I ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY NO CONTEST TO: 
> a violation of 
I freely make the following statement of specific facts comprising elements of each offense: 
I have read and understand the foregoing statements. I swear under penalty of perjury that each statement is 
true. 
Date: V/l^/^6) Defendant: Q/jU^^ V^^^C^^\^ 
Date: Defense Attorney: 
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Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 0 2003 
SALT/LAKE COUNTY 
By. reread 
NT Deploy Clerk 
JOHN N.BREMS- 3769 
RONALD F. PRICE - 5535 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378 
Attorneys for Taylorsville Justice Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF PAUL 
CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL; 
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT, 
Respondents/Plaintiff 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
Re: 
Case No. 020907603 
Criminal Case No. Y0002077 
Judge: Sandra Peuler 
Respondent Taylorsville Justice Court's motion to dismiss and Petitioner's petition 
for post-conviction relief came before the Court for hearing on Friday, 17 January 2003, 
at 2:00 p.m. Petitioner was present and represented by Heather A. Brereton of the Legal 
Defenders Association. John N. Brems and Ronald F. Price of the law firm of Parsons, 
Davies, Kinghorn & Peters appeared on behalf of respondent Taylorsville Justice Court. 
Karl Hendrickson of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's office appeared on behalf of 
respondents Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham, and the Salt Lake 
County Jail. 
& * «*. 
The Court, having reviewed and carefully considered the papers filed by the 
parties, the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, and the 
arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises and upon good cause showing, 
hereby enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
1. In March 2000 petitioner was arrested in Taylorsville, Utah, and was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. Petitioner was subsequently arraigned before the Honorable Michael 
Kwan, Taylorsville City Justice Court Judge, in Case No. Y0002077, Taylorsville Justice 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Petitioner subsequently pleaded guilty to both charges in Case No. 
Y0002077. 
3. At the time petitioner entered his guilty plea in Case No. Y0002077, 
petitioner was not represented by counsel. 
4. Because the Taylorsville Justice Court is not a court of record, there was 
no record of the exchange or colloquy between Judge Kwan and Petitioner relative to 
Petitioner's right to counsel and Petitioner's understanding of his right to counsel. 
5. Although there is no record of the exchange or colloquy which occurred 
between Petitioner and Judge Kwan relative to the issue of right to counsel, Petitioner 
waived his right to counsel, which waiver of right to counsel was accepted by Judge 
Kwan. 
2 
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6. Prior to Petitioner entering his guilty plea in Case No. Y0002077, a trial had 
been scheduled to be held on 20 July 2002. 
7. On 18 July 2002, two days before the scheduled trial, Petitioner voluntarily 
appeared before Judge Kwan and informed Judge Kwan that he desired to fully take care 
of the matter that day. 
8. At the time Petitioner voluntarily appeared before Judge Kwan on 18 July 
2002, Petitioner had another case pending before Judge Kwan, Case No. Y0002036, 
which was also scheduled for trial on 20 July 2000. On 18 July 2000, Petitioner informed 
Judge Kwan that he desired to also take care of Case No. Y0002036 that day. 
9. On 18 July 2002, Judge Kwan then conducted a complete Rule 11 colloquy 
with Petitioner in Case No. Y0002077. Judge Kwan also engaged in a complete Rule 11 
colloquy with Petitioner in Case No. Y0002036. Thus, on 18 July 2002, Judge Kwan 
engaged in two complete Rule 11 colloquies with Petitioner. 
10. On 18 July 2002, Judge Kwan had Petitioner read and sign a waiver form 
used in Taylorsville Justice Court at the time Petitioner entered his guilty plea. Petitioner 
subsequently signed the waiver form. 
11. Judge Kwan also provided Petitioner with a form titled Possession of 
Controlled Substance (Respondent's Exhibit 9), which explains the elements and 
potential penalties for possession of marijuana. Petitioner executed the Possession of 
Controlled Substances form on 18 July 2002. 
12. On 18 July 2002, Judge Kwan specifically asked Petitioner if he had read 
and understood the waiver form. Petitioner told Judge Kwan that he had read the waiver 
form, and that he understood the waiver form. 
13. Judge Kwan asked Petitioner if he reads and understands the English 
language. Petitioner responded that he did. 
14. Judge Kwan explained to Petitioner his rights to counsel, and asked 
Petitioner if he understood that right to counsel. Petitioner responded that he did. 
15. Judge Kwan engaged in the foregoing colloquy with Petitioner twice on 18 
July 2002, inasmuch as Petitioner was appearing before Judge Kwan in Case No. 
Y0002077, and also in Case No. Y0002036. 
16. Judge Kwan did not specifically ask Petitioner about his educational level 
on 18 July 2002. However, Petitioner was well known to Judge Kwan, inasmuch as 
Petitioner had participated in the Taylorsville Justice Court's Drug Court program for more 
than a year prior to 18 July 2002. Additionally, Petitioner had appeared before Judge 
Kwan on several other cases. 
17. Based upon the colloquy Judge Kwan engaged in with Petitioner on 18 July 
2002, and based upon Judge Kwan's familiarity and experience with Petitioner, Judge 
Kwan determined that Petitioner was able to represent himself. 
18. Petitioner testified on cross-examination that he understood his rights, that 
he knew about and understood his right to have a lawyer appointed for him, and that he 
voluntarily waived that right. 
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19. Petitioner made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to 
counsel. 
20. Other evidence presented to the Court further demonstrates that Petitioner 
made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel on 18 July 2000. 
This evidence includes, without limitation, the following: 
a. Petitioner had previously appeared before Judge Kwan in several 
other cases, and had waived his right to counsel in at least two of those cases; 
and 
b. on 21 June 2000, Petitioner waived his right to counsel in two separate 
cases pending in the Midvale Justice Court. One of those cases, Case No. 
2000040045 involved charges of reckless driving, possession of a controlled 
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
21. Upon entry of Petitioner's guilty plea on 18 July 2002, Judge Kwan 
sentenced Petitioner to a sentence of 360 days in the Salt Lake County Jail, with the 
sentence suspended upon, inter alia, Petitioner's successful completion of 1 year 
probation and participation in the court's drug program. 
22. Judge Kwan subsequently revoked Petitioner's probation and, on 13 
February 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to 360 days in the Salt Lake County Jail, with 
credit for 36 days for time served. Accordingly, Petitioner was ordered to serve 324 days 
in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
5 
23. Between 13 February 2002 through the first part of January 2003, Petitioner 
was serving time in the Salt Lake County Jail on other convictions unrelated to Case No. 
Y0002077. Accordingly, as of 17 January 2003, Petitioner had not served any of the 324 
days sentence imposed on 18 June 2002. However, at the time of the hearing in this 
case, Judge Kwan had ordered that Petitioner be placed on probation. Thus, at the time 
of the hearing, Petitioner had been released from the Salt Lake County Jail and was on 
probation. 
24. Throughout this case Petitioner has challenged only the sentence imposed, 
but has not challenged the underlying guilty plea and conviction. Thus, Petitioner 
concedes that his underlying guilty plea and conviction in the underlying case are valid. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In addition to those conclusions of law implicit in the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
the Court concludes as follows: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106, Petitioner bears the burden of 
proof in this proceeding. 
2. Petitioner has not met his burden of proof under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
105. 
3. Petitioner made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to 
counsel. 
4. The petition for post-conviction relief should be dismissed with prejudice. 
6 
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Done this A O day of February 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
Heather Brereton 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
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I hereby certify that on the ^^~ ^
 0 f Jafrtrary 2003 a copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was served in the manner 
indicated below to the following: 
Heather Brereton 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




Karl L. Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 









Third Judicial District 
JOHN N. BREMS 3769 
RONALD F. PRICE 5535 
PARSONS DAVIES KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-4300 
Attorneys for Taylorsville Justice Court 
By. 
FEB 2 0 2003 
SALT 
iN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON, 
Defendant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF 
PAUL CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL; TAYLORSVILLE 
JUSTICE COURT, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil Case No. 020907603 
Criminal Case No. Y0002077 
Respondent Taylorsville Justice Court's motion to dismiss and Petitioner's petition 
for post-conviction relief came before the Court for hearing on Friday, 17 January 2003, 
at 2:00 p.m. Petitionerwas present and represented by Heather A. Brereton of the Legal 
Defenders Association. John N. Brems and Ronald F. Price of the law firm of Parsons, 
Davies, Kinghom & Peters appeared on behalf of respondent Taylorsville Justice Court. 
Karl Hendrickson of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's office appeared on behalf of 
\ -\ t 
respondents Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham, and the Salt Lake 
County Jail. 
The Court, having reviewed and carefully considered the papers filed by the 
parties, the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, and the 
arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises and upon good cause showing, 
and having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, hereby enters 
the following order: 
1. For the reasons stated at the hearing, the Court denies Taylorsville Justice 
Court's motion to dismiss; and 
2. The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that Petitioner's petition 
for post-conviction relief shall be, and the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice. 
DONE this Jjd day of February 2003. 
„ BXITHE.COURT 
if / : ^ & & ^
 /-x 
\^\ Sap/draM.Peuler 
\ ; - ' Third District Court Judge 
^ - -"•' 
frV*. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
Heather Brereton 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
\"V* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ffift^ day of February 2003 a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITH 
PREJUDICE was served in the manner indicated below to the following: 
Heather Brereton 
Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 





Karl L. Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
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